Bon Appétit

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Omelet_With_Fixings.jpg
Image: Wikimedia Commons
  1. It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelette for breakfast tomorrow. [Premise]
  2. It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, or fail to believe anything that is true. [Premise: divine omniscience]
  3. Therefore, God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese omelette for breakfast tomorrow. [From 1, 2]
  4. If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone’s power to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. [Premise: the unalterability of the past]
  5. Therefore, it is not in Clarence’s power to bring it about that God has not always believed that he would have a cheese omelette for breakfast. [From 3, 4]
  6. It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelette for breakfast, and that he does not in fact have one. [From 2]
  7. Therefore, it is not in Clarence’s power to refrain from having a cheese omelette for breakfast tomorrow. [From 5, 6]

So Clarence’s eating the omelette tomorrow is not an act of free choice.

From William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, quoted in W. Jay Wood, God, 2011.